Abstract: The paper is a reply to the critical reviews of the author's A Theory of Social Action by Anton Leist 1 Marvin Belzer 1 and Julian Ni da-: RUmelin in this journal. As to Leist's main criticisms 1 which concern the notions of social action 1 social practical reasoning 1 individualism 1 and social norms 1 they are argued to be incorrect and unjustified. Belzer's criticisms are on the whole weil taken 1 and in fact oll of them have been noted by the author in his later work. Belzer does not 1 however 1 consider these newest analyses and improvements. Nida-RUmelin presents some corrments on the relationships between collective preferences and weintentions. These points are correct.
Introductory Remorks
First I wish to thonk my critics Anton Leist 1 Morvin Belzer 1 ond Julion Nido-RUmelin for toking the trouble of not only reading my lang -too long -book A Theory of Sociol Action (1~84 1 'ATSA' for short) but also for thinking up lots of criticisms ogoinst it. I also wish to thonk Analyse & Kritik for the chonce to respond to my critics. While my reply will mostly consist in more or less detailed corrrnents on my critics remorks I will stort by some generol comments pertinent to the whole matter.
I finished the first version of the book in 1981. Although I did polish the monuscript o little more before it come out 1 I was moinly working in a different field during [1982] [1983] [1984] . In 1985 I come back to o key issue in the book 1 viz. the problem of giving o vioble onolysis of we-intentions 1 and I am still on this tr ip at the time of writing this reply. Tagether with my co-worker Koorlo Miller I noticed some problems 1 difficulties ond locunae 1 with my onolysis given in the book. We wrote o short paper We-intentions and Sociol Action (Tuomela/Miller 1985) where we commented on some of the locunoe in the book but kept the onalysis of we-intentions bosicolly intact. Let me reproduce thot onolysis here 1 with X renging over joint oction types (cf. ATSA 1 35 ):
(WI 1 )
Roimo Tuomelo
A member A 1 of a collective G we-intends to do X if and only if (i) A 1 intends to do his part of X, given that (he belleves that) every (full-fledged and odequately informed member) of G or ot least that a sufficient number of them, as required for the performance of X, will (or at least probably will} do his part ( thelr parts) of X; (Ii) Ai believes that every (full-fledged and adequately informed) member of G or ot least that a sufficient number of them, as required for the performance of X, will (or at least probably will) do his part ( their parts) of X; (iii) there isamutual belief in G to the effect that (i) and (ii) .
Later on it appeared that some revisions were called for. Our newest attempt appears in a forthcoming paper entitled Group Intentions. The mast importont new change there ls perhops to make a clear distinction between the presuppositions of Intentions ond the conditions of conditional Intentions. in the above ~nalysis of we-intention the word "glven" in clause (i) ambiguously covers both conditions and presuppositions. Once the distinction is made clear it can be seen that there are unconditionol we-intentions at least in the sense of we-intentions analyzable with unconditional mere Intentions in clause i). The previous 'condition' appearing above in clause i) is now regarded as a presupposition only. So we get the following analysis:
A member A 1 of a collective G we-intends to do X if ond only lf (i) Ai lntends to do his part of X;
( ii) A 1 has a belief to the effect that the conceptual joint action opportunities · for X obtain, especially that at least a sufficient number of the full-fled. ged and adequately informed members of G, os required for the performance of X, will (or at least probably will) do their parts of X; (iii) A 1 believes that there is a mutual belief amang the partlcipating member s of G to the effect that the conceptual joint action opportu nities for X obtaln.
While I shall not here go deeper into the matter, Jet me still point out o couple of things about the lotest anolysis (WI 2 ). First, its second clause has the stotus of a conceptual presupposition underlying the Intention-ascription. Secondly 1 we can now deal with properly conditional weintentions and analyze them by adding conditions to the Intentions in clause (i) and by possibly complicating the matters in other ways 1 • too. Thirdly 1 various ot her refinements are introduced in our newest attempt. Thus 1 the requirement of mutual belief is weakened to r eplicative social loop beliefs (roughly in the sense of David Lewis). Our argument for them is most centrally based on the three assumptions that dealing with the cas!'!s .of two agents A and 6 1 for simplicity -A intends to do his port 1 believes that B will do his 1 and also believes thot he cannot do his own part only by himself. Then we arrive at the iterable loop belief "A believes that B believes that A will do his part of X". lt is hard to do work in a new field like the theory of many-person action ond 1 more generally 1 sociol action 1 if one expects the details of one's anoly ses to last for year s an d decades. I can onl y wis h belotedly that I would have had the opportunity to benefit from criticisms such as the present ones before the publication of the book.
Reply to Leist
( 1) Anton Leist's review-article (Leist 1985) of my book would require perhops an equally long response 1 if I really wanted -and had the opportunity -to conment on oll the points of disagreement between . us. But I will have to compromise. My conments below will mainly fall into two groups: 1) corrections of obvious misunderstandings and ·distortions of my views 1 and 2) answers to Leist's criticisms of some centrat topics or arguments in my book. lt is an unfortunote feature about his review that dass 1) has become unnecessarily !arge. ( One special but onnoying problern . is that Leist has chosen to present only grossly simplified and in some cases clearly incorrect and distorted versions of my analyses of key notions; some of the warst distortions will be corrected below.) I would have strongly preferred to concentrote on interesting Counterarguments against my views rather than to spend pages on corrections of simple misunderstandings. But I suppose my duty here is to try to set the record straight 1 ot least os for os I am concerned.
One of the most centrat ideas of my book is to use 'we-attitudes' 1 especially we-intentions and mutual beliefs 1 to build a conceptual account of actions involving several actors 1 especially actions jointly performed by several agents. (We may call mony -person actions social in a 'norrow' or 'strict' sense.) This is done in rather greot detail in the moin part of the book. Those developments rely in part on my previous work on single-ogent octions and in part on a kind of conceptual individuolism. (Contrary to what Leist at least seems to think 1 strong rationality claims are ovoided throughout the book.) As a kind of by-product of the main theory several other reloted issues, such os conceptuol problems reloted to sociol norms, sociol control, explonotion of sociol oction, receive rother natural treotments.
Leist sums up his criticol review os follows: "Tuomelo's most original ideo in the onolysis of joint oction, t hot of we-intentions, is not brood e noug h to cover more thon o port of sociol oction in the corrmonly understood sense. His 'sociol' p rocticol reosonin g incorporotes an implou sible p r emiss. The gome-theoreticol reconstruction of sociol norms strikes one os unlikely to be fulfilled in sociol reolity. Hordly ony of these onolyses back up the individuoli st cloims of Tuomelo's project." (Leist 1985, 180) I sholl below present orguments to the effect thot oll of the obove four stotements by Leist or e incorrect ond unjustified.
Leist's criticisms fall into four groups hoving to do with I) sociol oction, 2) sociol procticol reosoning, 3) individuolism, ond 4 ) sociol norms. I will below comment an these topics in this some order, thus storting with I).
(2) Leist discusses the notion of sociol oction in his Section 2. There hewi t hout presenting orguments -is strongly ottoched to the ideo thot Weber's old notlon of sociol oction is somehow the most centrol notion of sociol oction ond tries to orgue agoinst t he opproprioteness of some of my notions. I do indeed regord Weber's concept os interesting ond impo r tont, but I think ot the some time thot we should not seek for t he notion of social oction in some kind of essentiolistic foshion. Anywoy, Leist is here mistaken an severol counts. First, he opporently hos not reod through the book nor hos he even looked up the 49 ( ! ) different notions referred to in the Index by the phrose "sociol oction", or eise he could hordly hove restricted his dlscussion to only three of the oction concepts thot I hove onolyzed (viz. those defined by (5.5), (5.10), or its equivolent (PCS), ond (9.1) of ATSA).
Ta proceed to o brief discussion, Iet us stort with Weber. According to him an oction is sociol in so for os, by virtue of the subjective meoning ottoched to it by the octing individual (or individuols), it tokes occount of the behovior of others ond is thereby oriented in its course. Now surely this definition -which undoubtedly would benefit from elucidotioncoptures an interesting sense of sociol oction. Indeed, it con be regorded os closely reloted to my notion of o widely understood sociol oction ( ATSA, 1). 'Furthermore , it con be ot least portiolly elucidoted by some of my intentional notions defined in Chopter 9 of ATSA. (See e.g. its note 6) where I in foct explicitl y propose (9 .57) os such an explicotion, which Leist does not even refer to.) Anywoy, my primory concern in ATSA hos been the elucidotion of joint sociol oction ond not individual sociol oction. Leist somehow would hove liked me to onolyze individual sociol octions more closely. While thot would be o wort hwhile project ond while ports of Chopter 9 of ATSA ore concerned with it, it is still cleorly peripherol to the moin project of the book. (Leist even goes so for, on p. 190, as to cloim thot occording to my occount an individual acting alone con never act sociolly. But I never soid anything like thot.)
Leist tries to orgue thot my onolysis of sociol oction is inodequote, and does it in the following woy. He picks out my onolysis of intentionolly performed sociol oction (PCS) -of which he lncorrectly cloims on p. 184 that it gives my most generol notion of sociol oction -and cloims thot it ls too norrow, relative to Weber's notion. Next he picks my broodest, nonintentional notion (9 .1) ond cloims thot it is too wide. Weil, the truth of the matter is thot neither of these notions is meont to explicote Web er's notion. ( Rother my -perhops partial -explicotion of his notion is given by (9.57), cf. obove. ) I could of course equolly weil by Leist's method of orgumentotion show many silly things, for instonce thot Weber's notion of sociol oction is not odequote for chorocterizing intentionolly performed joint oction, viz. my key notion (PCS).
Leist also seems to dislike my most generol notion of joint oction as defined by (5 . 5) of ATSA. I hove not, however, been oble to find o proper criticol orgument to which I could respond. So I sholl not discuss the matter further in this context, to sove spoce. So, in oll, Leist hos not succeeded in presenting interesting criticisms of my elucidotions. Especiolly he hos not succeeded in showing thot we-lntentions ore not brood enough to cover whot plousibly con be understood by (full blown) intentional joint octions. Much of his discussion seems to boil down to the uninteresting verbal issue of whot to toke the word "sociol" to cover -rother thon being concerned with the conceptuolly interesting feotures of the vorious types of 'sociolity' thot it con be token to cover.
( 3) Let u s then p roceed to Leis t's discu ssion of sociol procticol reosoning in Sectlon 3. of his poper. The unfortunote thing obout the whole section is thot it does not even get off the ground, for the whole orgument is bosed on o slip on Leist's port! For the rothe r incredible matter of foct is thot in his tronslotion of my schema (PR 1 ) from p. 346 of ATSA Leist tronslotes both "move" (premiss 1)) ond "corry" (conclusion c 1 )) by "schieben". But the whole point ot thot schema relies on the foct thot moving is o more generol notion thon thot of corrying -otherwise no intention-tronsference could toke ploce! While this is not the only error in Leist's discussion it is course grove enough to moke his Section 3. olmost or wholly worthless.
(4) Leist's discussion of individuolism in his Section 4. is octuolly the only port of his review which ' does not miss its torget by miles. But even here he gets corried owoy ond goes on to present some olleged improvements of my theses, ond I do not reoll y find them interesting enough to comment ·an. Anyway, what I am doing with (conceptual) individualism in the book is this. I have presented a programrnatic thesis (Cl) of conceptual individualism, meant to be a principle for construing and forming social concepts (ATSA, 27). Thesis (Cl) says the following, given a 'constitutive' social theory T (which ideally will be an ultimate, best-explaining theory) which has S ~s its set of social, including holistic, predicates and I as its of individualistic or individualistically acceptable predicates: The meanings of the social predicates in S depend entirely upon their usage with the predicates in I, assumed ·antecedently understood, within the meaning-specifying theory T.
I will be happy to grant that (Cl) would profit from a mare detailed analysis of how to effect a dichotomy between social and individualistic predicates and of how to characterize in detail what the 'dependence of usage' of predicotes involves. (I have later tried to analyze this dependence in terms of a kind of su pervenience relation.) It should be noticed thot (Cl) is very programrnatic as it makes the division of predicates into individualistic and holistic ones ultimately to hang on the development of science. Therefore I did not even try in A TSA to say very much about the matter and therefore also Leist's a priori speculations of how to do that do not seem too weil taken (and hence also my (Cl) is to be preferred to Leist's theory-independent (Cl*)). Let me, however, say t hat I tend to agree with his remarks on p. 193 -see my similar remarks on p. 477 of ATSA, which Leist does not seem to have noticed. (Specifically I agree that (CI ) should be taken to be about elementary individualistic predicates.) His clause 2') of his (CI*) on p. 194 seems acceptable -as far . as it goes. His (CI**) again seems too strict, for the analysantia of holistic social notions may have to involve also other predicates than merely the individualistic theoretical predicates Leist suggests.
Leist seems to consider on p. 195 that my analysis of we-intentions in terms of (WI) is not individualistically acceptable because the analysans centoins the notion of a collective ond because -or so I construe Leist - My conclusion concerning Leist's discusslon of my individualistic progrcmrne of concept formation is that he has not succeeded in formulating effective arguments against it.
(5) Leist's fourth topic concerns my brief anolysis of social norms. As his formulation of my analysis is seriously wrang I will start by statlng lt correctly. The analysis is concerned wlth giving truth conditions for ru le Statements such OS "Everybody ought to do X when in C", call it N, and for analogous, mare complicated ones relative to a con-munity S. These truth conditions are supposed to tell which r ules quolify as social norms and which don't. When the truth conditlons obtain, then that rule con also be said to 'exist' os o social norm in S. But giving such truth conditions also defines the concept of a social norm relative to an understanding of rules in the sense of ought-and may-sentences (but not relative to the concept of social rule). This remark should suffice to take care of Leist's relevant crltlcal remarks on pp. 198-199.
My analysis of social norms goes as follows (ATSA, 242):
Rule N is a social norm in S if and only if {a) the members of S, when in situation C {and believing so) are disposed to reason in ways justlfiable by the schema (SA 1 ) or a similar schema that they ought to do X in C; (b) most (or at least mony) members of S do X in C and some of them at least sometimes becau se of their so reasoning that they ought to do X in C; (c) the re is in S some {socially occepted) pressure, typically due to sanctions, against devioting from doing X in C; {d) the members of S have a mutual belief to the effect that {a), {b), and (c).
As the reader can verify, clauses a) -c) of my above formulotion differ from Leist's version. Especially grave is his distor tion of clause {a), for his rendering of it says that the members of S, when in C or when they believe that they ore in C, will ju s t!fy, in accordance with ( SAi), that they ought to do X in C. There are several differences between his and my version. To polnt out the mast serious one, according to my formulation the members of S, when in C and belleving so, are disposed to reason t hat t hey ought to do X in C . They are not required to justify this in any woy contrary to Leist's excessively strong formulotion; ond this grave error by my critic mokes most of his discussion concerning (o) irrelevant to my occount. (Fu rthermore 1 os I emphasize on p. 243 of ATSA1 the justifying inferences in question need not olwoys be too similor to ( SAi).)
Another criticism ogoinst (o) by Leist is that it does not ollow for obeying 'unpleasant' norms 1 os somehow the schemo (SA 1 ) only is concerned wlth pleosont utllltles ( utilities concerned wlth pleosont intrinsic desires). But this is incorrect. As chorocterized in Chapter 2 of ATSA1 my notion of utility is bosed on both intrinsic ond extrinslc wants (proottitudes). As extrinsic wonts con include unpleosont. proottitudes 1 Leist's criticism is invalid.
My obove remorks should in foct suffice to rebut oll the orguments thot Leist hos presented ogoinst my onolysis of sociol norms. (Leist is also dissotisfied with vorlaus other feotu res of my onolysis -without 1 however 1 presenting any o r guments. To this I can only soy thot I om sotisfied with them on the grounds given in A TSA.) Leist also cloims t hat my onolysis is not individuolistic in the sense of my progromme of concept formotion 1 becouse the notlon of o community ls employed in it. But thot would be o valid criticism only if no such onolysis can be given. However 1 os said 1 I hove sketched a progrorrmotic individuolistic onalysis of the notion of community on p . 266 of ATSA. But I don't cloim to hove oll the details ovoiloble presently.
Finally 1 I wish to thonk Leist for o criticism representing the perspective of o sociol holist. As t he obove reply shows my lang book is somewhat hord to reod, ond therefore it is perhops understondoble if o critic does not hove the time ond energy to dig out whot ond how I reolly hove argued. In any case Leist hos token up inter esting issues whlch would hove deserved a more thorough oiring than has been possible here.
Reply to Belzer
Belzer concentrotes on we-intentions in hls review ( Belzer 1986) . lt is u nfortunote that he did not hove the chance to revise his poper in view of the developments in my mentioned papers We-l ntentions ond Sociol Action and Group Intentions ( written jolntly wlth Koorlo Miller) 1 because procticolly oll of Belzer's criticisms were taken up ond dealt with in those papers. But things being os they ore I connot but briefly go through Belzer's crlt lcisms below. Before going lnto detolls I would like to soy that I enjoyed the intellectuolly high Ievel of his comments. He has the admirable copocity to go right to the kerne! of problems with sharp and generally good arguments. Below I shall go through Belzer's main criticisms and present brief responses to them.
( 1) To begin, Belzer starts his comr.entary by considering the notions of acting intentionally, acting with an intention, and intending to act. He correctly notices that in my account of both individual action and multiagent action I make the third notion the key notion, viz. mere personal intention to act in the single-agent case and we-intention in the multiagent case. The other two notion s are charocterized with the help of the third notion. Belzer seems to have some doubts about this programme. But as he does not present ony concrete criticisms there is not really anything for me to respond to on this occasion.
(2) On pp. 88 -89 of his orticle Belzer discusses problems related to the deconditionalization of we-intentions, where we-intentions ore understood in the sense of our obove (WJ 1 ). Let me moke two quick points. First, deconditionalization here concerns rather simple cases, which do not in my opinion require strong rotionality, contrary to Belzer's claim. Secondly, as I do not any more take standerd we-intentions to be conditional in the original sense, Belzer's criticism hos no force against my improved new account (see Group Intentions) but I acknowledge thot the issue raised by Belzer was not dealt with properly in ATSA.
(3) As to the social character of we-intentions, they involve social presuppositions (ones re.Jating them to the other ogents) and sociol beliefs (beliefs about others) and mutual beliefs. For an individuolist -who is not in an uncritical ontologicol or semonticol slumber -there is hardly much more to be desired os to 'sociolity'. The sociality of we-intentions is basically to be seen from the anal ysans of Wl in the sense just specified. (My speaking of the 'we-mode' is just informal jargon which in itself explains nothing, nor is meant to.)
One important disting uishing linguistic featu re can, however, be pointed out: When I we-intend, expressions of the form "We sholl do X", X referring to a joint action, ore true of me, whereas in the case of mere personal intending only expressions of the form "I sholl do Y" but not the mentioned social ones ore true of me. In A TSA I did not try to clorify the logical form of the content of we-intentions nor their ontic status, but operated on a 'surface Ievel' so to speak, having become rather sceptical about contents, essences and the like. On the surface Ievel and prior to deeper theorizing I could occept something like Cestonedan locutions and say thot "We to do X" represent the contents of we-intentions while "I to do Y" represent those of mere I-intentions. lf this kind of occount of content were occeptable in some deeper sense -about which I don't have much to say presently -we would have a distinction and a criterion of 'sociolity' on the Ievel of content, as Belzer wants it. As long as the tentative Raimo T uomela nature of this is kept in mind and as long as no ontological conclusions are drawn from it 1 it is oll right as far as I am concerned . (Notice 1 by t he woy that while my (WI 1 ) and (WI 2 ) are individualistic 1 they are not quite as individualistc als Belzer thinks (p.88 of the orticle). Thus both joint actions ond groups ore referred to in the analysons 1 and this perhops mokes it more plausible to mointain o deeper distinction between we-intention s and mere personal Intentions than Belzer thinks my analysis allows (although ultimotely I give some sort of individualistic underpinning for oll prima facie holistic notions).
(4) On p. Action and Group Intention. The basic idea in mf account is to understand the locution "his part of X" in clause i) of (WI ) in a strongly intensional sense describable by saying that the agent does whatever he does in that context as his part of X. And if he in this context intends to do something xi OS his part of X it is required that xi is his part of X and that he believes so and that he intends to do X .
• On the basis of this we can impose the following requirement on the a 1 nalysans of (WI 2 ):
If Ai intends to do xi OS his part of X then he intends that X be realized. And if this principle is accepted Belzer's counterexamples don't go through.
(9) At the end of his paper Belzer makes a proposal of his own for characterizing we-intentions. I read his analysis on p. 93 so that it makes individual Intentions expressed by "We shall do X" primary (instead of taking the group's having an intention as primary). As a consequence we face the task of anal2zing the somewhat uneleer expression "We shall do X". But isn't my (WI ) doing just that? Note, too, that if one then goes on to define we-intentions in terms of the group's intent!on ~ as Belzer does -one is dealing with a broader we-intention than my motivational, action-prompting notion. (In my joint paper Group Intehtions the discussion of the notion of being in reserve relates to that.)
Reply to Nida-RUmelin
In his paper ( Nida-RUmelin 1986) Nida-RUmelin discu s ses the so-called logic of collective decision (or choice) and comments on its relationships to my account of we-intentions. The paper is a clear and informative surveytype discussion of (some relevant features of) the state of the decisiontheoretic approach. As, however, the relevance of that discussion to my book is not very close and as also Nida-RUmelin's attempt to make the connection to my atcount of we-intention is very sketchy, it suffices for me to be very brief in my reply.
As many critics of the decision-theoretic approach (including myself in ATSA) have argued, its conceptual framewerk is too poor and its underly-ing rotionolity ossumptions ore too strict, and this goes not only for the descriptive opplicotions of the theory but also for its normative opplications (cf. 'ought implies con') ). While this is not the ploce for another discussion of the shortcomings of thot opproach, Iet me here only comment on the relationship between (collective ond individual) preferences ond we -intentions.
Nido-RUmelin is particularly interested in onalyzing collective preferences, viz. the preferences attributed to collectives. I find his discussion occeptable on the whole. He ends his onalysis with giving, in his (DI), o sufficient condition for a group's having a specific preference, and as long os his condition is not token as o necessory one as weil, I can agree. At this point it should be emphosised that I hove not in ATSA reolly tried to onolyze the corresponding matter in the cose of we-intentions, while I hove suggested thot oll members' hoving the we-intention is ot least sufficient for the group's hoving it. But my moin concern there, in the context of my discussion of we-intentions, was to onolyze we-intentions ottributed to single members of o group.
Nido-RUmelin cloims thot there ore no conceptuol connections between his (DI) ond (DII ) , where the lotter gives my anolysis in ATSA of o weintention shared by an individual. This seems correct at least in the sense that one connot somehow conceptuolly generote o group's we-intention from its preferences (or ot least one connot generote its members we-intentions from their relevant preferences), for on the whole intentions ore not conceptuolly onalyzoble in terms of notions such os preferences, wonts ond beliefs, or so it con be orgued ot ony rote. At the very end of his poper Nido-RUmelin points out thot there moy be both empiricol ond normative connections between collective preferences ond we-intentions ottributed to groups. I ogree with him here. I hove also myself mode the point obout the putative empiricol connections (e.g. in the cose of the Prisoner's Dilenmo situotions) in ATSA ond loter works. Nido-RUmelin's point about normative connections derivoble from o procticol syllogism is interesting ond might warront further study.
Let me finally point out thot there is yet onother kind of conceptuol connection between we-intentions ond underlying preferences thot I discuss on pp. 423-425 of ATSA. Very roughly speoking, my occount of an ogent's intention to do Y conceptuolly requires thot he hos o proottitude (viz. o~ intrinsic or extrinsic wont) towards Y ond thot this reveols thot his preference towords Y is strenger thon towords ony other alternative. In the case of we-intentions we must odd onother requirement, for, ossuming the performonce of X to be the content of the we-intention here ond Y to be the ogent's port of X, we must also require thot, when we-intending to do X, he also purports, ond thus intentionolly strongly prefers, X to be
